Though land use and its control had an emerging centrality in the Arab-Zionist dispute in Palestine, as a political issue Jewish land acquisition and Arab land sales were often muted, for various reasons, during the Mandate. My argument is that the convenient and mutually beneficial symbiosis that developed between the Arab land owner and the Jewish purchaser was a prominent factor. The purpose of this paper is two-fold: to discuss why and how the protection of the agricultural tenant became the least objectionable alternative to complete prohibition of land transfer for British, Arab, and Jew, and how it also became an object of dissension and rancor within the Arab community; and to document where possible those instances when Arab tenants' protection was summarily and dispassionately circumvented despite increased efforts by the British to eliminate legal loopholes in existing legislation.
During the first decade of the Mandate the political leadership of the Palestine Arab community all came from the landed classes, 3 or from segments of the political community that had a direct financial interest in land, including lawyers, merchants, moneylenders, and religious Both the Arab vendor and the Jewish purchaser found the legal protection of tenants a nuisance, but more bearable than land transfer prohibitions. Though there were repeated efforts by the Palestine administration to maintain tenants on their holdings, no government legislation ever totally favored the tenant against his landlord. As a consequence, the Arab vendor continued to satisfy his desire for capital, and the Jewish purchaser, an insatiable desire to own land. The British believed that if efforts were not made to prevent the wholesale removal of tenants from their land, a class of brigands, highwaymen, and landless peasants would ultimately become a financial burden on the Palestine administration. That had to be avoided at all costs.
Tenants' protection put the onus of financial or compensatory responsibility upon the vendor and the purchaser and not the British government in London or Palestine. The British were repeatedly myopic in the belief that legislation could protect the rights of cultivators in situations where the Arab vendor and Jewish purchaser sold each other out with abounding vigor and discretion. Yet, the ordinances encompassing tenants' protection gave the administration demonstrable paper evidence that the civil rights of tenants were being protected. The fact that these ordinances had to be revised periodically because of prodigious circumvention by vendor, purchaser, and tenant merely adds credence to the supposition that legislative palliatives did not suffice in Palestine. In this instance, the British government was an umpire trying in vain to implant new regulations into the land transfer game that, as time wore on, became increasingly complex, devious, and uncontrollable.
The population of Palestine in November 1931 numbered 1,035,821 of whom 759,712 were Muslims, 174,610 were Jews, 91,398 were Christians, and 10,101 were classified as others. 5 Over 440,000 persons were supported by ordinary cultivation. Of these 108,765 were earners and 331,319 were dependents. The earner category was divided: 5,311 (5 percent) derived their livelihood from agricultural rents, 70,526 (65 percent) were cultivating earners, and 32,539 (30 percent) were agricultural laborers. 6 Among the cultivating earners there were thought to be approximately 56,000 (80 percent) fellahin who owned the land they worked and 14,000 (20 percent) agricultural tenants. 7 A legal distinction was made by the Palestine administration between the agricultural tenant who had an express or implied agreement with a landlord and cultivated a holding, and the agricultural laborer who did not cultivate a holding, even though he was hired to do agricultural work. The definition of an agricultural tenant was broadened as the Mandate progressed to encompass a larger number of agricultural laborers, but at no time was any legislation enacted to protect the owner-occupier. Protection of the owneroccupier was contemplated by the Palestine administration in early 1936, but that legislation was postponed owing to the outbreak of the Arab general strike in April of the same year. In simple numerical terms, therefore, the legal protection offered to agricultural tenants applied to only a very small proportion of the total number of fellahin engaged in agricultural pursuits. Owneroccupiers and agricultural laborers were never entitled to legal protection offered by the mandatory government.
In passing it should be noted that one-quarter of those engaged in some form of ordinary cultivation, approximately 26,000 earners, returned a subsidiary income. Rent receivers, owneroccupiers, agricultural laborers, and grazers of flocks engaged in fruit growing and picking, became tenants on another's property, bred grazing animals, hired themselves out as day laborers, or worked as tailors, weavers, or cobblers. In the early 1930s when an increasing number of owner-occupiers were selling uneconomically tenable small parcels of land, there was a corresponding change in the number of tenants and agricultural laborers. Tenants already engaged with a landlord were displaced by a landlord's sale, effecting in turn a reduction in the number of agricultural laborers who could be employed in seasonal work such as plowing and harvesting. Many owner-occupiers who sold remaining parcels of land, instead of engaging in per diem labor in the urban building trades in Palestine, swelled the tenant ranks, preferring to remain in agricultural pursuits despite a perennial succession of poor crop yields.
The land transfer process had a profoundly debilitating effect upon relationships between landlord and tenant. The landlord, sometimes exclusively interested in his own financial betterment, saw the land he possessed as merely a potential remunerative object. Some eagerly entered into collusive arrangements with Jewish purchasers in efforts to rid their lands of "tenant encumbrances" prior to notification of the administration of an impending land transfer. When the administration was finally informed that a land area was to be transferred and registered, there was most often no physical evidence of previous tenant occupation.
Agricultural tenants and laborers who were prevented from practicing their traditional forms of livelihood not only expressed their hostility toward some of their landlords, brokers, and intermediaries who acted in consort with Jewish purchasers, but directed their antagonism against the British Mandatory and Zionism. But, due in large measure to their exceedingly poor economic state and inability to find sustained support from social classes above them, the expression of their enmity did not emerge until the 1936 general strike. Further accentuating hostility toward the Mandate, besides its tacit support of the establishment of a Jewish national home, was the notion that the mandatory government did not care about them or intentionally harmed them. 8 Arab cultivator feeling toward the British was exacerbated by the understanding that they would receive land from the government through the efforts of the Development Department in the process of resettling "landless" Arabs. From the claims brought before the government under the Protection of Cultivator's Ordinance of 1933, many believed that their rights to land, lost in the transfer process, would be rightfully restored to them. Both beliefs proved illusory and only further contributed to Arab cultivator animosity toward the British and Zionists.
CULTIVATORS AND PROTECTION, 1918-1929
The first real effort made by the mandatory government to keep all classes of agricultural workers tied to land came in 1918 with the closure of Palestine's land registry offices. Under the Ottoman regime no special legal protection was offered to cultivators, though some debtor protection existed under an 1871 law and in Egypt through the Five Feddan Law of 1912. The latter, through trying to tackle the problem of indebtedness, was successfully evaded by both fellahin and money-lenders. 9 In Palestine, Arab landowners before World War I could and did evict tenants without offering them compensation. 10 Moreover, when land was transferred, all tenants could have been dismissed by the owner, and, indeed, the purchasers made it a condition of purchase that the land be transferred free of cultivators. and closed subdistrict land registry offices.
By its Public Notice of April 1919, the military administration acknowledged that circumvention of its prohibition was occurring. Apparently, promissory notes or other written instruments legally acknowledging a debt were executed, providing for the debtor either to pay back the face value of the promissory note or sell his land or share of land as satisfaction of the debt at some future date, presumably when land transfers would again be officially sanctioned.
Because of a severely depressed economic condition, one fellah sought to have his advance paid in terms of a given amount of olive oil. A second mechanism used to circumvent the prohibition on land transfers involved the potential seller signing irrevocable powers of attorney that could be exercised in the future. 13 15 By article 6 of the LTO the district governor was charged "to withhold his consent of a transfer, unless he was satisfied that in the case of agricultural land either the person transferring the property, if he is in possession, or the tenant in occupation, if the property is leased, will retain sufficient land in the district or elsewhere for the maintenance of himself and his family." The precise amount of land to be left to the owner-occupier was to vary according to region of the country, based upon the land quality as determined by the district governor.
In its effort to reduce speculation in land, the LTO clearly forbade the district governor to give assent to transfers where property was valued in excess of 3,000 Egyptian pounds or in area of 300 dunams in the case of agricultural land. The High Commissioner had the prerogative to overrule a decision of a district governor in granting permission for a transfer. Such government interference in the land transfer process greatly angered Arab landowners, who were themselves severely in debt by World War I's conclusion. Landowners and scions of Arab landowning classes fervently desired the repeal of all these restrictions. They never betrayed any enthusiasm for them. 16 Many wanted the option to engage in land speculation for remunerative and personal purposes, while others were keen to sell portions of their land to immigrating Zionists.
The protection, were unable to enforce provision of a maintenance area because they lacked data about land in Palestine --its ownership, its tenants, and its use. In the period of time between the initial purchase negotiations, which sometimes lasted for months and even years, and the official notification of the administration of a pending transfer, tenants' rights were easily compromised.
Testifying before the Shaw Commission in 1929, the director of lands noted that A vendor would come along and make a contract for sale and purchase with the Jews. We would know nothing of this until 4, 5, or 6 months later when the transaction would come to the office. We then instructed the District Officer to report on the tenants. He would go out to the village and in some cases he would find that the whole population had already evacuated the village. They [the tenants] had taken certain sums of money and had gone, and we could not afford them any protection whatever. In other cases it was found that a large percentage of the population had already gone before the transaction came to us, and we could not find out who the tenants were, they had no written contracts, and we did not know what compensation they were getting.
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An overwhelming preponderance of the tenants for whom we have records preferred monetary compensation to a maintenance area. Moreover, contrary to the director of lands' testimony, the Palestine administration did know in some cases what compensation tenants were receiving, since agreements between Jewish purchasing agents and Arab tenants were usually registered by the notary public at local subdistrict offices of the government. 20 It is difficult to prove connivance on the part of administration officials regarding intentional frustration of tenants' protection, but susceptibility to traditional business practices cannot be ruled out entirely.
The amount of money given to Arab tenants to vacate a land area prior to official transfer was often equal to or greater than the net amount of a tenant's yearly income, after rent, tax, and debt payment. A tenant's annual income was variously estimated to range anywhere from 9 to 30
Palestine pounds. 21 Average compensation paid to the 688 tenants formerly employed by the Sursocks approximated 40 Palestine pounds per tenants and his family. 22 The amount of compensation was usually based upon the amount of land actually worked by a tenant reckoned in terms of feddans plowed. In instances where there were agricultural workers in occupation, but not legally entitled to any form of compensation, Jewish purchasers in some cases paid amounts ranging from 5 to 15 Palestine pounds in order to give them funds to live on while not working and to find work elsewhere. It was not uncommon for the Palestine Land Development
Company to make liberal payments to local village mukhtars, to better persuade their villagers to vacate their lands. 23 The absolute cost of compensating tenants increased as legal protection was steadily strengthened and tenants became increasingly aware of their rights under the law, as the problem of land availability grew more acute, and as the price of land sharply increased. 24 In order to ease further their evacuation from recently bought land, agents for Jewish purchasing organizations made additional payments on behalf of tenants for tax and debt arrears and for crops in the ground but not harvested.
An unknown number of tenants did receive alternative land as prescribed by LTAO.
They eventually arranged to convert it into monetary compensation, left the area for agricultural pursuits elsewhere, moved to neighboring Arab villages and subsisted on per diem income, or migrated to the urban areas and often there to the building trades. Many Arab tenants who received monetary compensation moved alternatively eastward, and distinctly away from Jewish settlements. 25 Thus, during the 1920s, precedents were established for tenants' protection for the remainder of the Mandate. Legislative protection only applied to a very small percentage of the agricultural population; buyer-seller collusion was a common method of circumventing tenants' rights; tenants readily accepted monetary compensation to vacate the lands they worked; and Jewish purchasers developed the belief that any piece of land could be purchased if the price were right. Though the POCO demanded that a landlord pay fair compensation to his tenants for improvements on the land made by them, no tenant could receive such compensation, in the event of eventual eviction, unless either the landlord had given written prior consent to such an improvement or the tenant had informed the landlord in writing of his desire to effect a particular improvement. In those few cases where improvements were made by tenants of long standing and agreements were made between the landlord or his local agent and the tenant, agreements were predominantly oral and not written. POCO further protected the landlord by enabling him to give his tenant(s) one year's written notice of a rent increase, forcing the tenant unwilling or unable to pay the increment to quit the land on the date when the increased rent would become due. Where a tenant received notice to quit, the landlord could either pay compensation to the out-going tenant for the preparation of the land for the next crop, or the landlord could anticipate selling his land free of tenant encumbrances by giving required written notice to the obliging tenant, or announcing a rent increase to the recalcitrant tenant. He could then prepare his land for a future crop, and receive from the purchaser compensation for either the prepared land or for the crop already in the ground.
THE PROTECTION OF CULTIVATORS ORDINANCE, 1929, AND AMENDMENTS
In Chancellor recognized that the POCO was inadequate in protecting Arab agriculturists. He took particular note that the JNF had purchased lands through the legal mechanism of a public auction ordered by the Nablus District Court in satisfaction of a collusively arrived-at mortgage debt. 30 Tenants on such lands had no tenancy privileges and were therefore liable to eviction. 31 Chancellor also recognized that landlords were terminating tenants' occupancy by increasing the rent beyond their means to pay. He also wished to stop land sales in excess of 1,000 dunams and thereby return to the principle embodied in the LTO of 1920. In his proposed draft ordinance to amend the 1929 legislation, Chancellor sought to increase tenants' protection. excluded. 41 Once more, Robert Drayton, the acting attorney general, pointed out that the High Commissioner (nor anyone else) could not control agreements reached among the tenant, landlord, and purchaser. 42 The definition of a tenant continued to exclude agricultural laborers receiving a monetary wage and owner-occupiers. The legal protection offered in 1932 still only applied to perhaps no more than 20,000 of the more than 100,000 fellahin engaged primarily in cultivation.
THE PROTECTION OF CULTIVATORS ORDINANCE, 1933, AND AMENDMENTS
In an effort to streamline, redefine, and broaden tenants' protection, a new ordinance was enacted in August 1933 superseding all previous POCO legislation. Unlike earlier POCO legislation, drafts of the ordinance were not communicated to the JA for comment. Considerable input into the drafting came from Lewis French, the director of development, who had recommended both a Homestead Protection Ordinance for the owner-occupier and a new POCO.
As the High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope believed that tenants formerly displaced would be resettled through the efforts of the Development Department's Landless Arab Inquiry and future displacement would be prevented by the new POCO. Wauchope and the Palestine administration were naive in believing that legislation and the bureaucracy could effectively provide tenants' protection, but his consummate commitment to tenants' protection was evidenced by the immediate promulgation of the ordinance by publication in the Official Gazette, a procedure reserved generally for changes in tariff and custom dues.
The principal element in the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance of 1933 provided that no "statutory tenant" (person, family, or tribe) of one year could be disturbed by the owner, unless he was provided with a subsistence area whose adequacy was determined by a governmental board. Additionally, the tenant was given security against disturbance, was protected against unrestrained rent increase, and was entitled to compensation for improvements if evicted. In making itself the final arbiter between two segments of Palestinian Arab society, the Palestine administration generated societal conflicts, splintering further an Arab population already divided by regional, religious, social, and political affiliations.
While there was a concerted effort made to enhance the rights of the tenant, squatter, and landless Arab, the British government did not commit itself to the protection of the owneroccupier or to the agricultural laborer, nor did it forsake totally its informal alliance with landowning and land-benefiting classes. High Commissioner Wauchope acknowledged that the Palestine administration could not undertake to resettle agricultural laborers, if for no other reason than the financial expenditures involved. 43 The POCO of 1933 permitted landowners the prerogative to petition government to resume a tenanted holding for purpose of upgrading its cultivable capacity, its development, or for closer settlement, colonization, or disposal for building purposes. Many landlords did seek governmental assistance in ridding their land of tenants under these provisions in section 15 of the POCO. 44 This POCO prevented the tenant from selling or mortgaging his tenancy right, but did not prevent him from giving up his land to the landlord before the granting of "statutory tenancy."
Where tenants did make prior agreements with their landlords to vacate land, and then claimed "statutory tenancy," the government board established to protect the tenants' rights ruled in favor of the landlord. Informal agreements were sometimes made between the landlord and his tenants, in which the landlord, interested in freeing his land of tenants, did not collect a portion of the crop as annual rent and paid the tenant's tithe, for which the tenant left his land. 45 The immediate result of the ordinance's enactment was an increase in the number of disputes over the right to use and dispose of land. There were surprisingly few claims to tenancy rights from Arabs with respect to Jewish-owned land. This lack of claims was evidence that Jewish landowners were finding little difficulty, by means of payment of liberal compensation, in persuading Arabs who claimed rights to abandon their claims. There was the case of eleven cultivators in the Ramleh subdistrict who had their claims for "statutory tenancy" upheld against the Hanotiah Company, a Jewish colonization company. Three days after the judgment in their favor they chose to leave their lands after receiving 600 Palestine pounds. 46 Most disputes that arose under the ordinance's jurisdiction were between Arab landlords and their tenants. working land that had never been registered in the land record books, the establishment of rightful ownership first had to be determined by the land courts, a lengthy process in its own right. If it could then be shown that the claimant owned land in addition to the land in which he was a tenant, and that area was deemed adequate for his subsistence, then his "statutory tenancy"
claim was not upheld.
The new ordinance, like its predecessors, was open to abuse, misuse, and circumvention.
Some cultivators saw in the new POCO an opportunity to enhance themselves financially, either by seeking to extract monetary compensation from a landlord interested in selling his land free of tenant encumbrances or by squatting on land and expecting to use it until a decision was made about the claim. Some bona fide tenants plowed areas larger than their normal capacity would allow in order to deny the area to other agricultural workers who might otherwise have squatted on a landlord's property for the purpose of gaining compensation or working the land legitimately. The bona fide tenants believed that they might be entitled to larger compensatory amounts with fewer claims against the same landlord. 50 The impact of anticipated monetary demands caused some landlords to reduce the actual amount of land under cultivation, reducing in turn the crop yield and their rents, calculated on a fixed percentage of the yield. There were instances where the Arab landlord concurred with a claimant's request for "statutory tenancy"
after the land had been purchased and legally registered. Such a practice resulted in the signing of contracts between Arab sellers and Jewish purchasers, stipulating that the seller was responsible to hand the land over free of tenants. 51 Provision of the money for the compensation came either from the seller or the purchaser depending upon the land sales agreement. Another simple means of evading tenants' rights was the production at the board hearings of a receipt and agreement signed by the claimant acknowledging that he worked the land without the consent of the landlord, thus negating "statutory tenancy" classification.
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Before the passage of the POCO of 1933, some landlords drew up lease agreements with tenants for a certain rental amount to be paid in cash rather than in kind. The tithe on such lands was often paid by the tenants directly to the tax collectors or to agents working for the landlord who also collected the rents. But the existing Commutation of Tithes Ordinance obliged the landlord to pay the tax directly. After the passage of the POCO of 1933 some tenants believed that the tax collection procedure would not permit the landlord to evict them from their land.
Hence, many of them ceased paying the amount of the tax due the landlord and in turn due to the government and ceased paying the rent as well. Landlords, responding to their tenants' refusal to pay rent, appointed guards to watch the threshing floor, or, if the landlord was resident far distant from his lands, requested the administration to collect the rent and the tax on his behalf. 53 On at least one occasion the tenants killed the guard employed by the landlord to collect the rent and tithe.
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Tenants in some cases were appropriately coached about their rights. In one instance claimants repeated, parrot-like, the block and parcel numbers of the lands in which tenancy rights were claimed, yet were unable to state the block and parcel numbers owned and occupied by themselves in the same village. 55 The extent to which Palestinian Arabs, involved in the nationalist cause, incited recalcitrance on the part of some fellahin against their landlords and against the Zionists is in need of further study. There is evidence that "intriguers and blackmailers redoubled their efforts to obtain money from landlords by inciting others to enter land in which they had no rights."
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The recourse left to landlords was in section 15 of the POCO, which permitted resumption of a holding. In some cases, the Arab landlord was able to gain eviction of his tenants because he wished to upgrade his holding to cash crop cultivation of oranges. 57 In other cases, the landlord sought resumption of a holding and eviction of his tenants because he considered himself helpless and poor. 58 Another Arab landlord, who served in the Palestine administration, asked and received the resumption of his holding and the eviction of his tenants because their tenancy threatened his future with serious material loss. The landlord argued that he should not be forced to suffer, merely to provide a tenant with means for his living.
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An immediate effect of the new POCO was a particular reluctance on the part of Arab landowners to lease or release their lands to tenants. In the southern district of Palestine, Arab landlords evaded the spirit of the ordinance by not permitting resident cultivators to begin plowing for the coming agricultural season, thus not evicting them, but making their already precarious economic situation more tenuous. Landlords in the coastal plain sometimes left all their lands fallow rather than run the risk of tenancy claims. 60 As a result of this practice, many tenants spent hours appealing to sympathetic magistrates, police officers, and other administration officials who were, however, in no position to help them legally. By shutting tenants out of land they previously occupied and denying them the opportunity to cultivate the winter crop immediately after the summer crop, optimum seeding and land preparation time was lost.
The most unanticipated result of the POCO was its stimulating effect upon land transfers.
Many landowners who still possessed reasonably large estates of 1,000 dunams or more sold their lands to Jewish purchasers rather than run the risk of tenancy claims. In some instances, landlords approached the JNF, requesting and receiving money to compensate their tenants of prior years in preparation for eventual sale to Jewish purchasing agents. 61 As far as it concerned the process of Jewish land purchase, this procedure enabled the Arab landlord to deal directly with his tenants, while the Jewish purchasing organization only supplied the compensatory amounts. This had the dual effect of cutting down on the number of bogus claims that might otherwise have been lodged against a Jewish company, and reducing the frequency of JewishArab tenant contact, always susceptible to overtones of antagonism, resentment, and disquietude.
Not unexpectedly, the JA, its affiliated land purchasing organizations, and the Palestine Arab community reacted strongly and negatively to the implementation of the newly written POCO. As was evident from the Palestine Arab press, most Arab response to the new POCO was negative. Many articles pointed to the inadequacy of the POCO, for it did not totally prohibit land sales. Al-Jami`ah al-Islamiyyah of August 3, 1933 remarked in one article that the POCO came too late, since the coastal plains had already been transferred into Jewish hands.
Moreover, noted the paper, in the future the Arab landowner will shun the fellah and will not allow him to cultivate his property lest he remain on it permanently,and so the poor fellah will be chased by the Zionists. The new POCO created serious problems for Jewish land purchase. Because it gave a tenant rights against the landlord and did not prejudice those rights when land was transferred, the new owner was as liable to tenancy claims as the seller. Even if the seller contracted to sell his land free of tenancy encumbrances, the purchaser could not be sure that he would not face numerous tenancy claims. As a result of tenants' rights to occupy land as protected under the Land Disputes Possession Ordinance, the Jewish owner of newly acquired land often found himself involved in very costly and lengthy judicial proceedings. Settlement with claimants to tenancy often necessitated out-of-court payments, sometimes forcing the purchaser to pay compensation to the tenants twice, once before the transfer and once after the transfer was effected.
The second major criticism of the POCO lodged by Jewish purchasers concerned the limitations placed upon the landlord. By virtue of the ordinance, as soon as a tenant received administrative recognition of "statutory tenancy," he became the charge of the landlord for life.
If the tenant decided that he preferred another parcel of land, for whatever reason, the landlord was obliged to reserve both the land from which he moved and the land to which he moved as maintenance areas. Since no area limit was placed upon a tenant's holding, some claimed that more land was necessary for their livelihood than they actually needed or could work, farming portions of it out to others who in turn paid the "statutory tenant" rent for its use.
While many landlords, as noted, resorted to the resumption of their holdings, the ordinance deprived the landlord of absolute freedom to dispose of his land in whatever manner he wished. Land became, as a result, an illusory security forcing financial institutions to be cautious in granting credit or allowing collateral for what might well be encumbered land. The JNF argued that the ordinance perpetuated the practice of grazing at the expense of favoring more intensive use of otherwise cultivable lands. 64 In an effort to broaden further the definition of a "statutory tenant" and increase Nevertheless, Arab tenants gladly took compensation to vacate their holdings. Some relished the opportunity while others were reluctant to accept anything but land. Ultimately, the peasants were defenseless against the process of dispossession and the legalized but relentless pressure that went with it. 66 Such pressure emanated simultaneously from Arab sellers, Jewish purchasers, and an agricultural economy that was precarious at best. Many who received monetary compensation saw these lump sums as means toward debt extrication. Most squandered the money given them. Very few invested the proceeds in other, more profitable commercial or agricultural pursuits.
Colonel C.F. Cox, the Nazareth district governor in 1920-1921, zealously defended the rights of tenants to receive land as compensatory government was interfering in a matter where it had not been asked and where tenants preferred to receive money. 67 And whereas, you have purchased the said lands and houses with all the rights and benefits appurtenant thereto on behalf of the Palestine Land Development Company, and the American Zion Commonwealth, and you caused the said properties to be surveyed and to be registered in the names of the said two companies.
And whereas, we are not in a position to purchase the said properties or any part of the same, owing to our inability to pay the price, and you have offered us sufficient land for cultivation,
We therefore, of our own free will do hereby inform you that we decline your said offer, as we have obtained lands for cultivation elsewhere, and we are not in need of land, and we undertake that by the 5th of January, 1925, we shall evict and deliver for your use our houses, and remove from the said houses our families and our cattle, and we shall deliver the said houses to you free from any impediment and we shall leave the lands of Afuleh, its houses and other buildings and deliver the same to you.
And we further undertake to deliver to you four camel-loads of fodder per feddan, And we acknowledge with thanks the receipt from you of £25 (twenty-five pounds) per feddan, viz., I, Selim al-Saadi, received from you £50 for two feddans, and I, Salem (al)-Saadi, received £25 for one feddan; and I, Mustapha al-Shari, received from you £25 for one feddan;
and I, Ali al-Khalaf, received from you £25 for one feddan; and I, `Abdullah Muhammad Jawish, received from you £50 for two feddans, and we Arifeh and Atfeh, heirs of Kamel Assad, for ourselves and in our capacity as guardians of our infant brother, Farla(?) and the other heirs, received from you £50 for two feddans, and this by way of compensation for the crop and any other work done by us on this land, and as consideration for our refusal of your said offer of land for cultivation, and we hereby waive by way of full and irrevocable waiver any rights which we may have had to the said lands and houses, and we declare that we have no further right to demand the purchase of the said land or any part of the same, nor do we demand land for cultivation nor any rights to the crop, nor any other rights whatsoever.
properties (viz., the said houses) and to leave the said village within the aforementioned period, we shall be liable to pay you by way of rental for the said houses and lands at the rate of half-apound per day for each feddan, and in addition to this if we fail to leave and deliver, or we fail to comply with any of the terms herein mentioned, we shall be further liable to pay you the sum of £50 per feddan by way of damages for the damage caused to you and of any Court or other fees which you may incur without the necessity of any Notarial or other notice, and our failure to deliver, or our default shall be deemed to be sufficient notice within the meaning of Article 107
of the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure.
Yours, etc. TOTALS  240,209  129,254  688 27,434 --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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